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Copyright law is largely a response to new media: from the printing press through radio, 
photocopiers, and digital computers, changes in copyright reflect the increased public availability 
of information reproduction technologies.  But while the exclusive rights conferred by copyright 
are shaped by the technologies they respond to, the opposite is also true: technology is shaped in 
response to the requirements of copyright, altering or innovating designs to either avoid or 
accommodate the demands of the law.  Nowhere has this dynamic interaction been more 
apparent than in the 2001 copyright decision against Napster and in the succeeding impact of that 
case.  The Napster case and its progeny reveal a pattern of creative “inventing around” previous 
definitions of formal copyright boundaries.  Such interactive re-imagining of technical and legal 
standards continues in current legal controversies regarding digital delivery systems such as 
streaming media, digital lockers, and “cloud” services, extending the pattern present in Napster 
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On February 12, 2001, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
endorsed the previous decision of a lower court, holding that the operators of the Napster peer-
to-peer file sharing network were presumptively responsible for copyright infringement 
conducted on its system (A&M Records v. Napster, 2001). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case 
for entry of a preliminary injunction requiring Napster to police the infringement on its system.  
Once Napster implemented measures to purge unauthorized file-sharing, it rapidly lost 
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subscribers, investors, and content, and eventually descended into bankruptcy.  Napster’s assets – 
primarily its distinctive logo – would be sold off and deployed in an entirely different type of 
authorized music venture (Logie, 2006), but the Ninth Circuit’s decision was effectively the end 
of the system that launched the Internet file-sharing phenomenon. 
 
Napster’s demise was of course intended by its opponents not merely to remove a major source 
of unauthorized music reproduction, but to serve as a warning to the owners and potential 
investors of similar business ventures.  Yet the Napster decision proved a largely pyrrhic victory 
in the protracted, losing rearguard action of legacy entertainment businesses against the rapid and 
pervasive spread of digital reproduction technologies (Giblin, 2011, pp. 178-79).  Napster’s 
popularity and prominence offered an easy target for a copyright infringement challenge, but its 
removal initiated a proliferation of equally unauthorized peer-to-peer services, with fewer and 
fewer clear targets for legal action. 
 
The Napster decision also marked the emergence of a particular pattern of technological 
antiphony to the assertion of copyright, a phenomenon that has become increasingly pronounced 
in subsequent copyright cases.  Most recently, it has been apparent in the video streaming case 
American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo that was recently decided by the United States 
Supreme Court, in which the technology at issue is obviously and admittedly designed to skirt 
the formal definition of infringement announced previous copyright decisions.  More than the 
specific doctrines and legal precedent provided by copyright file sharing cases, this technical 
response to legal declaration typifies the legacy of Napster and subsequent decisions on digital 
content delivery. 
 
It is this pattern of technological response that I will explore here. In this article I focus will on 
the interplay between law and technical design as illustrated by Napster and subsequent U.S. 
copyright decisions.  Although copyright varies somewhat between jurisdictions, I will focus 
here on the U.S. system in which the Napster case was adjudicated and within which Napster’s 
influence can be most directly traced, realizing that the effects I explore will undoubtedly be seen 
in other copyright jurisdictions. I begin by sketching a few salient features of the U.S. copyright 
system, particularly the doctrines of secondary liability that were determinative in the Napster 
case and its progeny.   
 
I then offer some policy analysis concerning this repeated phenomenon of “inventing around” 
copyright constraints, considering whether this phenomenon furthers any of the societal goals 
that are implemented in copyright law.  I draw both from the literature regarding technical 
“code” as a behavioral constraint, and from parallel policy analyses in patent law where 
“inventing around” is a well analyzed phenomenon.   As a separate but related form of 
intellectual property, patent law offers useful insights into the circumstances under which 
technology might be re-configured to avoid copyright.  At the same time, copyright involves its 
own unique considerations, differing from patent both in the purpose of its exclusive rights and 
in the structure of the law that engenders such rights.   I conclude with a discussion of such 
considerations and how they might figure into copyright policy going forward. 
 
 




Classically, copyright was not intended to be directed toward technological discovery or 
progress.  The core subject matter of copyright historically has been, and today remains, largely 
directed to aesthetic and artistic creations: literary works, dramatic works, choreography, musical 
compositions; pictorial, graphic and sculptural works.   Certainly the format of such works has 
changed over time, moving from paper, clay, and canvas to celluloid, magnetic media, and other 
digital formats, but the aesthetic nature of the creative works fixed in such media has remained 
fairly constant (Litman, 2001).  Additionally, the artistic genres enabled by new media formats 
have joined the more venerable subject matter of copyright: for example, audiovisual works and 
sound recordings are relative latecomers to the canon of copyright.  But these, too, are artistic 
works that rely upon new technology for their instantiation, rather than constituting new 
technologies themselves. 
 
If anything, copyright was classically intended as a response to technological discovery or 
progress.  There is little reason for a legal regime to control copying when the material 
affordances of technology will naturally police themselves – if copying is time and labor-
intensive, as would be the painstaking manual copying of texts in the medieval scriptorium, then 
the supply and price of copies is essentially self-regulating (Burk, 2010).  Copies will be few, 
and their price will be high.  As new technology such as the printing press lowers the cost and 
speed of copying, prices fall, availability rises, and natural copy control by means of physical 
impediments deteriorates, allowing the works to be more easily appropriated (Goldstein, 2003).  
Creators may be less likely to invest in new works that can be quickly and easily 
misappropriated, as there is no assurance they will be paid for works that can be acquired for 
free.  However, legal exclusivity can replace some of the control that was lost due to more 
effective copying technology.  As increasingly effective copying technology is developed and 
disseminated – offset lithography, xerography, digitization – legal exclusivity is called upon to 
fill a greater and greater gap between the initial cost of creation and the cost of subsequent 
dissemination (Depoorter, 2009). 
 
Consequently, the suite of exclusive rights encompassed by copyright is structured toward 
providing the control and opportunity for remuneration that eroding material affordances no 
longer supply.  These rights have changed and expanded over time, as the technology changes 
and as new creative forms enter the copyright subject matter canon.  Copyright conveys the 
exclusive right of reproduction, the “copy-right,” that allows the owner to authorize or prevent 
copying of the protected work (17 U.S.C. § 106).  But copyright carries with it a set of other, 
related rights, such as the right of distribution, which also allows the copyright owner to permit 
or prevent most sales, transfers, and conveyances of copies of the work.  Copyright similarly 
entails the exclusive right to adapt or prepare derivative works, as well as the exclusive rights to 
publicly perform or publicly display a protected work.   The scope and nomenclature for such 
rights varies a bit between jurisdictions; for example, many countries recognize a right of 
communication to the public which encompasses the American rights of public performance and 
display.  But in general international efforts at harmonization have produced copyright law with 
recognizable similarities around the world. 
 
While the subject matter of copyright is largely artistic rather than technical, the exclusive rights 
that attach to such creative works are frequently defined in technical terms.  Such technological 
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parameters are in large measure the detritus of repeated legislative amendments, prompted by 
lobbying on the part of established copyright industries when new technologies emerge to 
instantiate and convey creative content.  Such amendments divide rights and responsibilities 
among stakeholders, extend the exclusive rights granted by the statute, and sometimes create 
exceptions to or exemptions from existing exclusive rights (Litman, 2001). The amendments are 
typically couched in terms of the most contemporary technological threat to the hegemony of 
copyright holders.  Radio, broadcast television, xerography, cable, digital transmission, and other 
communication technologies have all left their mark on the statute as Congress has responded to 




Secondary Copyright Liability 
 
Technological design has also become a critical consideration in the assertion of certain 
exclusive rights accompanying copyright, which are incidental or ancillary to the rights 
enumerated in the statute.  In common law jurisdictions such as the United States, such rights 
may be added by the inherent power of courts enforcing the statutory direction of the legislature.  
Particularly important to the saga of Napster and its progeny are doctrines imposing secondary 
liability on those who do not directly infringe any of the exclusive rights articulated in the 
copyright statute – such rights were dispositive to the Napster case itself, and to the its legacy of 
designing around copyright doctrines.   
 
Courts developed secondary liability because it is quite possible for a clever miscreant to exploit 
the creativity of another by aiding and abetting copyright infringement – supplying financing for 
copying, perhaps, or advertising to sell unauthorized copies, or providing other enabling services 
that are not themselves infringement of the copyright.  With the growth of mass-marketed 
computer and consumer electronics, the provision of personal copying technologies to a broad 
audience has become perhaps the most common scenario that might lead to such secondary 
liability.  For example, in the case of Napster, it was clear that the owners and operators of the 
system were not themselves making infringing reproductions, or for that matter any 
reproductions at all.  Neither were they distributing or publicly performing the works of 
copyright holders – if such activities were occurring, they were occurring at the instigation of 
Napster’s subscribers.  The question then was whether Napster might be illicitly aiding such 
actions by providing its software and service, making the firm responsible in some fashion for 
the activities of its subscribers, even if no one at Napster was directly infringing copyright. 
 
Such secondary liability for “aiding and abetting” copyright infringement has traditionally 
developed under two doctrines, and due to its technical structure, Napster was found liable under 
both of them. The first of these, vicarious liability, rests upon the ability of a business entity to 
supervise and potentially benefit from others who are directly infringing copyright.  Drawing on 
a previous music piracy decision, Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, (1996) in which the operator of a 
“swap meet” or flea market was held vicariously liable for the sale of infringing cassette tapes at 
booths within the swap meet, the court held Napster similarly liable for music traded on its 




In Fonovisa the court had held that the land owner had the ability to control who entered onto his 
land, and benefitted financially from the illegal sale of pirated tapes at the market.  The land 
owner could have detected the infringing activity and expelled the pirates.  The court reasoned 
by analogy that Napster constituted the cyberspace equivalent of a swap meet land owner: it 
controlled who logged onto and who traded music on its system.  Napster’s system included a 
centralized database of files available for sharing; thus like the land owner, Napster too, could 
have detected the infringing activity and expelled the infringing file sharers.  Napster’s financial 
benefit was somewhat more attenuated than the fees charged to enter the physical swap meet; the 
heightened activity on its system was used to attract investors, but the potential financial gain 
was deemed sufficient for vicarious liability. 
 
An alternative but related basis for indirect liability in the Napster decision concerned the legal 
doctrine of contributory infringement, specifically, contributory liability for providing direct 
infringers with the technological means to infringe. The criteria for this type of liability were 
established by the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated “Betamax” decision, Sony v. 
Universal Studios (1984).  The technology at issue in the Sony case was the home video 
recording and playback Betamax device; because the Betamax in combination with a television 
receiver could record television and movie broadcasts, copyright owners objected that the device 
would be used by consumers to make unauthorized copies of such broadcast audiovisual works, 
and that Sony should be liable for aiding such likely infringement.  However, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that there should be no liability for providing consumers technology with substantial 
non-infringing uses, even if consumers perhaps would put the technology to infringing uses once 
it was available.  In the particular instance of the Sony case, the Court reasoned that using the 
Betamax recording capability to “time-shift” broadcast transmissions to an alternate viewing 
time was a fair use, and in turn a substantial non-infringing use, thus relieving Sony of liability 
for providing the home video recording technology to consumers. 
 
To avoid contributory infringement liability for supply millions of direct infringers with the 
technical means to do so, Napster attempted to portray itself as a technology having “substantial 
non-infringing uses” (Dogan, 2001).  For this prong of the Sony test, the linchpin issue in the 
Napster context concerned whether the “substantiality” criterion was quantitative or qualitative: 
to avoid liability, did the number of non-infringing uses for the technology need to rise to a 
particular, substantive level, or could the number of non-infringing uses be small but still socially 
significant despite their comparative paucity?  Clearly the vast majority of the material being 
traded on the Napster system constituted unauthorized digital files, primarily music, but also 
some software and video files.  Some significantly smaller percentage of the files traded were on 
the contrary authorized: some musical composers and performers, for example, approved of file 
sharing as a method of increasing audience awareness, or were using the file sharing system in 
lieu of more traditional distribution channels.  If substantiality were based on a quantitative 
measure, Napster was likely liable; if substantiality were based on a qualitative measure then the 
argument would shift to the value of fraction of facilitating a small number of authorized file 
trades. 
 
If the vast majority of material on the Napster system was likely infringing, the question of 
contributory liability depended on what the operators of Napster knew, and when did they know 
it?  Unlike vicarious liability, which imputes responsibility for infringement to the supervising 
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entity, contributory infringement requires knowledge of specific acts of infringement, and the 
criterion of substantial non-infringing use for provision of the technological means to infringe is 
critical to determining the necessary knowledge.   In the Betamax case, Sony knew that some 
consumers would abuse the recorder to make infringing copies of broadcast television programs, 
but it had no specific knowledge whether any given consumer at any given time was engaged in 
an infringing use or a substantial non-infringing use.  By contrast, the centralized database in the 
Napster system made it easy for the court to conclude that Napster had the means to know, and 
indeed must have known not only generally about possible infringement, but about the particular 





Napster’s centralized features thus formed the basis for both vicarious and contributory liability.   
Not surprisingly, the architectural basis of the Napster decision prompted a second generation of 
file-sharing systems based on technological architectures that attempted to avoid the centralized 
monitoring and control features that satisfied the knowledge requirement for secondary liability.  
For example, Aimster, a post-Napster file-sharing service that piggy-backed on the America 
Online chat application “AIM” (for “AOL Instant Messaging) employed an encryption feature 
that allowed only the file offeror and file recipient to know what was being transmitted over the 
system.  When sued for contributory infringement by music copyright owners, Aimster argued 
that unlike Napster, it had no way of knowing what was in fact being shared, because the files 
were unobservable due to the encryption (In re Aimster, 2003). The Court of Appeals reviewing 
the case was entirely unsympathetic to this rationale, opining that adopting an encryption scheme 
to avoid knowing about illicit activity was itself sufficient evidence of knowledge to invoke 
contributory infringement, and holding that “willful blindness” to the content of the 
transmissions satisfied the criteria for liability. 
 
Other peer-to-peer services took the design response a step further, sacrificing some of the 
efficiency and scaling properties of the Napster system to avoid the centralized features on which 
liability might be premised.  Subsequent peer-to-peer systems such as Grokster, StreamCast, and 
KaZaa avoided any centralized monitoring or control point, adopting more fully distributed 
architectures that dispersed indexing as well as content and exchange among multiple network 
nodes.  One approach, the KaZaa “Fastrack” network, located higher powered computers in the 
network and temporarily designated them as file indexing computers.  Alternatively, the 
“Gnutella” open source network architecture employed by StreamCast fully distributed file 
search and location functions by passing a file request from computer to computer, serially 
searching the individual indices kept by each (Strahalevitz, 2003).  Such designs allowed the 
purveyors of the software, quite truthfully, to assert that they had no means of knowing who or 
what was on their system at any given time, so that they had no ability to monitor or control the 
use of the system, and hence could not be vicariously liable for infringing activity.   
 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged the success of this strategy by 
inventing a new form of secondary liability in its review of a subsequent legal challenge to the 
Grokster and StreamCast peer-to-peer networks (MGM Studios v. Grokster, 2005). Declining the 
invitation to revisit the Sony standard for “substantial” non-infringing use, or to opine on the 
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level of infringing use at which an inference of knowledge could be drawn, the Court recognized 
that the architecture of the Gnutella and Fastrack networks shielded the peer-to-peer services 
from knowledge of any specific act of infringement.  But because there was separate evidence 
that Grokster and StreamCast had explicitly encouraged users to infringe, the Court reasoned that 
there was no need to draw inferences from the state of the technology; instead the services could 
be held secondarily liable for explicitly inducing infringement (Yen, 2006).  In effect, the 
technical redesign prompted the court to articulate a new form of secondary liability that relied 
upon intent, and so required no centralized technical features as mechanisms for monitoring or 
control over the system. 
 
Certainly the presence of secondary copyright liability places certain legal strictures on technical 
design related to content delivery.  A technical constraint that was at least implicit in the Napster 
decision, and foregrounded in the arguments over Grokster, was the extent to which technology 
designers might be required to incorporate infringement defeating technologies into their 
systems.  Both Napster and Grokster were castigated by the courts for failing to adopt some type 
of hash file matching, to identify and automatically block from the system files that matched the 
signatures of files owned by the music labels; failure to implement such systems was taken as 
evidence of an intent to encourage infringement.  The implications of this inference have not 
been lost on other service providers; subsequently, content hosting sites such as YouTube have 
implemented automated systems of exactly this type.  Such implementation has been 
“voluntary,” or at least volitionally adopted in order to head off some types of putative legal 
claims.  The question left open in the Napster line of cases was whether adoption of best 
available infringing technology might be legally required to avoid the inference of encouraging 
infringement. 
 
The development of the “substantial non-infringing use” standard in Sony was intended to 
answer this exact question negatively; to remove from technology manufacturers the 
responsibility of policing, even peremptorily, the possible bad behavior of some purchasers once 
the substantiality threshold is reached.  It has been suggested that this holding of Sony can and 
should be distinguished; some commentators (Dogan, 2001; Picker, 2005), along with the 
plaintiffs in Grokster, have argued that Sony sold stand-alone machines that could not be easily 
monitored for infringement after distribution into the hands of consumers, consequently it made 
sense to excuse Sony from policing the conduct of its customers.  However, current 
infrastructure allows for networked machines that could be designed for monitoring even after 
sale to consumers, and so requiring policing of how the technology is used makes sense.  But this 
argument only pushes the problem back a step: if technology designers have the choice between 
networked and stand-alone machines, and are required to adopt infringement preemptive 
technology if they choose to create networked machines, they might design around such a 
responsibility by producing stand-alone machines.  The same problem then recurs over whether 





If Sony stands for the proposition that non-infringing technical design is not legally required, the 
peer-to-peer cases suggest that legal requirements may nonetheless prompt technical re-design.  
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Grokster and KaZaa intentionally attempted to design around the contours of technological 
liability as mapped out by the Ninth Circuit in the Napster decision.  But this type of designing 
around copyright’s requirements is by no means unusual.  It appears for example in the more 
recent American Broadcasting Companies v. Aereo controversy which was decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the spring of 2014.  The Aereo storage and transmission technology at issue in 
the case was explicitly designed to conform to definitions of permissible activity articulated in 
previous copyright cases. Specifically, the American copyright statute grants copyright holders 
an exclusive right of public performance for their works.  Previous court decisions such as 
Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings (2008) held that an individually stored recording of a 
broadcast television show, accessed by a particular user at that user’s discretion, did not 
constitute a public performance of the show, but was rather a private performance, outside the 
ambit of the copyright holder’s exclusive right. 
 
In the Cartoon Network case, copyright owners of cable broadcast programs sued Cablevision, a 
provider of remote DVR services.  Cablevision’s service had essentially moved the video 
recorder out of the consumer’s home to a centralized location, while still maintaining Sony-style 
decentralized control over the use of the technology.  Subscribers could specify recording criteria 
and initiate recording. Recordings were made specifically for the particular subscriber and were 
accessible only by that subscriber.  Since Cablevision was not initiating the recording of 
broadcast programs, direct infringement was not a plausible theory for the lawsuit.  The case 
therefore turned on whether Cablevision was providing an unauthorized public performance of 
the recorded programs when it transmitted the recordings initiated by the subscriber.  Because 
recording, storage, and playback were consigned to an individual consumer rather than generally 
accessible, the court held that the transmissions were private rather than public performances, 
and so not prohibited by the exclusive rights granted under the copyright statute. 
 
Aereo built its service around technology meeting this definition of non-infringing private 
transmission.  The Aereo system is comprised of thousands of tiny antennae that receive 
broadcast programming.  Each antenna is assigned to an individual subscriber, and either 
transmits the signal directly to that subscriber via Internet streaming media, or stores the 
broadcast in an individual recording accessible only to the particular subscriber.  Thus, every 
step of the Aereo transmission was designed to permit only “private” performances, not public 
performances as defined by the courts, and so to skirt the rights of the copyright holder as 
articulated in previous copyright decisions. 
 
A majority of the reviewing panel in Second Circuit court of appeals, following the Cartoon 
Network precedent, agreed that Aereo’s set-up provided a private transmission, effectively 
skirting the statutory exclusive right for public performances (WNET v. Aereo, 2013).  Judge 
Chin in dissent asserted with some obvious outrage that the Aereo design was an “over-
engineered” “Rube Goldberg” contraption, designed solely to avoid the letter of the copyright 
statute.  Chin observed that there was no particular reason to design the system with tiny 
individual receiving antennae except as a dodge around the public performance right; absent the 
Cartoon Network definition of public performances, it might well have been more efficient to 
design a service for streaming and recording broadcast with a single receiving antenna.  The 
Supreme Court largely agreed with this stance, stating in the majority opinion that it considered 
the technical of the streaming system irrelevant to the proper outcome of the case.  Much as in 
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the Grokster case that went before, the Court appeared far more interested in achieving a 
particular result than in following the letter of the law, and held Aereo liable for publicly 
performing broadcast works without authorization.  
 
 
Inventing Around Patents 
 
But the outcome in Aereo and in Grokster present a puzzle.  From the standpoint of intellectual 
property policy, the tendency to adopt designs that skirt the law is hauntingly familiar.  A 
different branch of intellectual property law, patent law, has long entailed policy justification for 
“inventing around,” which is sometimes touted as one of the benefits of the patent system.  
Patent law is explicitly directed toward encouraging the development of new technology, rather 
than the development of new artistic or aesthetic content that is characteristic of copyright’s 
subject matter.  And, unlike copyright, the boundaries of the patent holder’s rights are defined by 
textual claims in the patent document; infringement occurs in cases of unauthorized making, 
using, selling, offering for sale, or importing technology that falls within the technological 
definition spelled out by the claims.  Competitors to the patent holder may therefore invest in 
developing substitutes that fall outside the claims, which is to say they “invent around” the 
obstacle of the patent right.  Patents are intended to encourage innovation, and are usually 
assumed to do so via the reward of exclusive rights in a meritorious invention, but the “inventing 
around” rationale suggests that they may also somewhat perversely spur innovation as others 
seek permissible alternatives to the legally encumbered technology. 
 
Inventing around in patent law is largely a result of textual formalism.  Because the scope of 
patent rights is defined by written claims, determining the meaning of the claims requires 
interpretation.  The settled first step in patent claim construction is deciding the literal meaning 
of the text, that is, assigning discrete denotations to words or phrases within the text.  This 
defines a conceptual boundary that determines not only what technology is covered by the 
patent, but also what technology is not covered by the patent.  Technologies that lack all the 
elements of the claims, or arrange components in some substantially different way, fall outside 
the formal denotation of the claims and so are not considered infringing.  Competitors to the 
patent holder are considered perfectly justified in developing or adopting alternatives that lie 
outside the interpretive boundaries of the claims. 
 
The positive view on the desirability of inventing around in patents is not uncontroversial.  
Although some commentators have agreed with the idea of inventing around as a positive spur 
toward innovation (Lemley, 2012), other commentators have been less enthusiastic about the 
concept, observing that inventing around patent rights may well lead to inefficient and 
duplicative invention by prompting development of unneeded or second best alternatives to 
patented technologies.  As observed by Michael Abramowicz, (2003) inventing around is closely 
related to patent “racing” and the question of rent dissipation.  Races to invent are typically 
considered wasteful, absorbing additional duplicative investment that eats up the value of the 
invention, and of any patent on the invention, before the invention comes into existence.  
Inventing around may be regarded as a sort of patent race in which one of the parties has already 





The more positive view casts patent claims as a kind of innovation obstacle course, intended to 
build fitness and character in the competitors who are forced to navigate its hurdles.  However, 
Martin Adelman (1982, p. 464) has argued that patent inventing around is unlikely to occur 
unless the patent holder and the competitor have very different estimations of the cost of 
developing an alternative technology.  If the respective valuations of inventing around are 
similar, the parties are likely to be able to negotiate a royalty for use of the patented technology 
that will be lower than the cost of inventing around.  Each party has an incentive to make this 
kind of a license work: the competitor will not wish to incur the inventing around cost if the 
royalty is cheaper, and the patent holder will set the royalty low enough to avoid inducing the 
competitor to invent around, as that generates an alternative to the patented technology.  Thus 
inventing around, when it occurs, in some sense represents a bargaining breakdown.   
 
Consequently, the positive view of inventing around requires a tricky allocation of economic 
surplus, as Suzanne Scotchmer (1991, pp. 34-35) famously observed, between the patent holder 
and the competitor.  Sufficient surplus from the social value of the follow-on innovation must be 
allocated to the initial innovator who obtains the patent, otherwise the patent holder may not be 
properly motivated to invest in the patented item. At the same time, enough surplus must be 
allocated to the follow-on competitor to ensure the necessary investment in inventing around, 
and private licensing may not accomplish this.  This suggests that incentives for inventing 
around may be deficient; just as inventing around may be socially wasteful if the private value to 
the competitor exceeds the social benefit of having a new alternative technology, so failure to 
invent around may be socially wasteful where the private value of the license to the patent owner 
exceeds the social benefit of having the new technology. 
 
 
Internal and External Perspectives 
 
Thus, some insight into copyright “inventing around” may come from copyright’s close cousin, 
patent law.  But copyright is not patent, and it is important to know when to distinguish the two.  
Certain considerations can be drawn out of the more general analytical framework developed by 
Oren Kerr (2003).  Kerr surveys a variety of Internet-related legal decisions and distils from 
them a pattern of decisional rationales adopted by legal decision makers when faced with 
applying existing law to technological fact patterns.  Kerr notes that law makers tend to take one 
of two approaches to dealing with the affordances of a given technology to which an existing 
legal regime is applied.  The first approach, which Kerr denominates the “internal” approach, 
tends to be purposive and outcome driven.  This internal approach tends to merge the viewpoint 
of the decision maker into the technology, pushing technical processes into the unnoticed 
background. Consequently, under this approach the legal decision maker treats the results of a 
given technological process as epiphenomenal, largely divorced from the actual structure and 
function of the technology.  The mechanics or workings of the technology are of little interest, 
rather it is the result that matters, however it was produced.   
 
At other times adjudicators break open the black box of technological function to expose the 
inner workings, taking account of the mechanism by which the ultimate outcome is achieved.  
This second approach, which Kerr refers to as the “external” view, tends toward atomism rather 
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than holism, mapping the particular requirements of the law onto particular functions of the 
technology.  Unlike the “internal” viewpoint, where the adjudicator is situated within the 
technological landscape, the adjudicator adopting the external viewpoint stands apart from the 
technology, observing it as an outsider, at arm’s length.  Thus the specific workings of the 
technology become an important component of the legal analysis, and distinctions may be drawn 
between technical outcomes with different mechanisms or designs.   
 
The divergence in approaches is both apparent and ubiquitous in the treatment of digital content 
delivery.  To take a fairly clean example of digital content delivery, at about the same time that 
the recording industry was arguing in court against Napster, they also brought suit against an 
early “digital locker” service titled MP3.Com.  The MP3.com service allowed users to receive 
streamed music from the subscriber’s collection by way of virtually any device the subscriber 
connected to the Internet.  Subscribers were required to verify that they possessed a copy of the 
music by inserting providing a CD to be scanned by MP3.com software via the user’s own 
computer.  Rather than uploading the music files to what we might now term “cloud” storage, the 
service would instead then stream copies that it had made of the music to users once a particular 
file was identified as being in the user’s possession. 
 
When sued by the recording labels who held copyright in the streamed music, MP3.Com argued 
that, parallel to the fair use in Sony, its subscribers were merely “space shifting” their ostensibly 
legally purchased music content to access it in different places, much as viewers in Sony were 
“time shifting” authorized broadcasts to a different viewing schedule (UMG Recordings v. 
MP3.Com, 2000).  This “space shifting” rationale had been accepted as fair use by contemporary 
courts in other contexts, most notably where music owners “ripped” files from CD recordings 
and moved the content to portable MP3 music players – the technological ancestors of the 
currently ubiquitous iPod (RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia, 1999).  However, in those cases, music 
owners had copied and “moved” their own files to a different medium, which was judged not to 
be the case for MP3.com; MP3.com’s service made copies without authorization and streamed 
those files to the owners of other copies of the same file.  The fact that MP3.com supplied the 
file, rather than the users supplying the file, was judged to be dispositive, and infringing. 
 
Presumably had MP3.com required its subscribers to actually upload their music files, rather 
than only verifying that they possessed a copy of the file, they might have escaped liability on 
the space-shifting rationale.  Subsequent digital locker services have been careful either to 
provide storage capacity to which users can upload their own files, or to provide access to files 
that users have previously purchased from that provider.  At some level such distinctions seem 
like needless hair-splitting; each time the file is “moved” to a new medium, what in fact occurs is 
that another copy is made, so however the digital locker is arranged, someone is making an extra 
copy of the copyrighted content.  Such an outcome-based view would be consistent with Kerr’s 
internal viewpoint, and with the position adopted by the service: subscribers were hearing “their” 
music, regardless of who made the copy.  But since the court in MP3.com instead took what Kerr 
would call the external viewpoint, who initiated the copying, how the copying occurred, and 
where the copies were disposed became critically important to satisfying the statute.   
 
Kerr’s insight is key to the outcome of the MP3.Com decision, as well as those of Napster or 
Aereo, because judicial adoption of an internal or external approach to digital content delivery 
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relates directly to the structure of statutory requirements governing such cases.  As I have 
indicated above, copyright statutory provisions were typically drafted in response to previous 
copyright threats, and couched in the terminology of older media functions.   As numerous 
commentators have observed, new media routinely adopt the form of older media: e-mail is 
mimics postal mail, VoIP mimics telephony, Internet streaming mimics cable television, and so 
on (Bolter and Grusin, 1999; Manovich, 2001).  To the extent that new media takes the form of 
older media, adopting Kerr’s “internal” stance may lead courts to treat the new media as they did 
the old, since both present the same or similar character – indeed, in the Aereo decision, the 
Supreme Court declared that it would treat Aereo as if it were a cable retransmission system, 
because in effect it acted like a cable system, even if its technical operation was different.  On the 
other hand, adopting the “external” stance would tend to lead courts to treat the new and old 
media quite differently, as the mechanics of the new medium are likely to differ significantly 
from that of the old, and may not map cleanly onto whatever processes or mechanics from the 





Some additional insights into copyright “inventing around” come, naturally, from the extensive 
literature on “law and code.” If the response to the Napster decision was a conscious re-design of 
subsequent peer-to-peer architecture, it was no accident that the age of Napster was also the age 
of Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Larry Lessig’s evangelical exposition on social action in 
the context of the Internet.  Lessig, drawing on previous work by Joel Reidenberg (1998) and 
others, noted that social behavior can be constrained or channeled through a suite of modalities 
that include normative expectations, market forces, formal legal penalties, and technological 
structures.  These constraints on behavior often operate in tandem, and can at times substitute for 
one another.  Thus, unauthorized copying of files might be deterred by normative expectations 
that copying is unacceptable, it might be deterred by market pressure making authorized copying 
a less expensive alternative, it might be deterred by formal legal sanctions for such behavior, or it 
might be deterred by designing technical systems in such a way that copying is difficult or 
impossible. 
 
As the title of his book indicated, Lessig was particularly interested in this last option, the design 
of “code” or technological architecture as a constraint.  The title of the book and its discussion 
even engage in some provocative word play with the term “code,” which in one setting may refer 
to the symbolic representation of computer operations, and in another setting may refer to formal 
written compilations of legal strictures.  Lessig explores the interplay between these meanings in 
some detail, and is particularly interested in the need for social architects to rely on legal 
constraints – such as heightened copyright law enforcement – when technological design actually 
lowered barriers to activity such as copying and distribution, which the architecture of the 
Internet clearly did.  In the years since his pathbreaking analysis, Lessig’s thesis has become a 
part of Internet orthodoxy and has long since been incorporated into the canon of both academic 
discourse and popular action.   Lessig’s ultimate message was that architecture matters, and this 
was clearly the pragmatic conclusion embraced by the Grokster generation of network designers: 




But such re-deployment of technical architecture in this fashion was perhaps not entirely what 
Lessig had in mind, and is certainly not the message for which he has become best known.  
Lessig suggested that technology could be deployed by governments, or for that matter by 
private parties, to constrain behavior; what has been less appreciated is the inverse proposition, 
that code sometimes supplies an escape from the imperatives of law, constituting a reaction or 
response to legal constraints.  This was the coding corollary that the Grokster and Aimster 
engineers followed, developing technological structures in the wake of the Napster decision that 
would circumvent secondary infringement by removing the centralized structures that led to 
liability.  In the case of patent inventing around, we have already seen Lessig’s alternatives at 
work: law triggers either a market negotiation or a technical response.  The re-design of digital 
content delivery follows a similar path. 
 
As in the case of inventing around patent claims, formalism is at work in such re-design, but here 
again Lessig offers the prospect of a different perspective.  Typically we think of textualism as a 
mode for interpreting written or symbolic texts, but Lessig’s view of social and technological 
equivalence suggests that technology may be “read,” or at least viewed, equally formalistically.  
Formalism need not be confined to written legal codes; the parameters of a technological 
implementation may similarly be treated as bright-line behavioral indices.  Indeed, Kerr’s 
external mode of analysis encompasses a type of technological formalism, regarding the features 
of the technology as discrete and definite units with which the discrete and definite units of a 
formal text can be associated.  Kerr’s internal view is by contrasts largely purposive, considering 
the desirability of the overall technological outcome, rather than the particularized mechanism by 
which the outcome is realized.  To the extent that the courts in Napster, Grokster, and 
subsequent cases have adopted a formalistic view of technological architecture, it should not be 
surprising that technical designers have used the external approach as a springboard to avoid 
architectural liability, just as tax avoiders might attempt to re-structure business operations 
around the formalities of a written tax code. 
  
To be sure, this subversive use of technical architecture has not gone entirely unnoticed; if 
Lessig’s Code demonstrated the deployment of technological affordances to constrain behavior, 
Tim Wu’s contrapuntal When Code Isn’t Law (2003) explored technological design based on 
legal loopholes.  Wu argues that the response to legal constraints will take the form of least cost 
avoidance; if compliance with law is the least costly alternative, then compliance can be 
expected to occur.  But depending on relative cost, reactions to law may take other forms, such 
as litigating or lobbying to change law, or re-structuring of business plans to exploit legal 
loopholes.  This latter effect is a common occurrence in taxation or regulatory compliance, which 
Leo Katz dubbed “avoision,” a portmanteau of “avoidance” and “evasion” (Katz, 1996).  Taking 
a page from Lessig, Wu observes that if formal law and technological constraint are at some 
level interchangeable, then avoision may occur by re-structuring technology rather than re-
structuring behavior such restructuring is less costly than compliance. 
 
But this picture, while useful, may be incomplete.  Technological avoidance may not necessarily 
be legal evasion, at least not in the sense identified by Wu.  In the Federal Circuit’s view of 
patent “inventing around,” such activity does not constitute avoision, at least under the definition 
discussed by Wu, of a least cost avoider attempting to avoid or evade the intent of the law.  To be 
certain, competitors to a patent holder who invent around are avoiding the alternative of 
14 
 
infringement, and as suggested above they will presumably do so only if inventing around is 
cheaper than the alternatives of infringing or licensing.  But avoiding the boundaries of patent 
claims is not the same as avoiding the intent of the patent law.  To the contrary, inventing around 
patent claims is rather considered a legitimate and desired response to the law; inventing around 




Inventing Around Copyright  
 
Thus, the response to the Napster decision and subsequent cases entails an effect, analogous to 
that in patent law, of “inventing around,” in which a competitor who might be an infringer is 
motivated to develop a new technological design that avoids infringement.  In this fashion, it 
seems that copyright doctrine frequently functions in a similar fashion to the text of patent 
claims, creating a perimeter of rights that competitors can design around in order to remain 
outside the formal definition of infringement.  This is largely an outcome of adopting Kerr’s 
external viewpoint.  By defining the exclusive rights in copyright according to technological 
affordances, courts are simultaneously defining permissible technological workarounds for such 
rights.  This effectively shunts technological creativity into particular technical instantiations that 
have been negatively – and perhaps unwittingly -- defined as non-infringing. 
 
However, certain differences from patent law’s inventing around are apparent and important.  To 
the extent that inventing around in copyright constitutes a bargaining breakdown, it is not the 
type of breakdown identified above in the patent context.   The Grokster and Aereo systems are 
not alternatives or substitutes for copyrighted works; they are alternatives or substitutes for, 
respectively, compact discs or for terrestrial broadcast – that is, for existing methods of 
delivering copyrighted works.  The goal of a Grokster or Aereo designer is not to circumvent a 
particular copyright, but to avoid liability for providing or delivering a class of copyrighted 
content.  Thus copyright holders and innovators do not have different valuations of the cost of 
licensing the existing intellectual property versus the cost of developing alternative intellectual 
property, as might be the case in patent inventing around.  The question for the competitor in 
copyright inventing around is not whether to invest in a substitute movie or musical composition.  
The disparity in valuation is rather more a comparison of apples to oranges; that is, 
contemplating the cost of licensing the intellectual property versus developing an alternative 
technological delivery system. 
 
This asymmetry between the alternatives becomes starker on closer examination.   Because the 
alternative to inventing around in copyright is not the development of an alternative creative 
work, the licensing alternative involves the collective action problem of licensing not a particular 
copyrighted work, but rather the rights against secondary liability held by all copyright owners 
whose works might be infringed by the delivery under the current technology.  The transaction 
costs of licensing all the various copyright owners is likely to be extremely high.  The copyright 
holders, at the same time, will tend to be invested in the existing technology that falls within the 
rights defined by the statute, or may possibly stand to benefit from new technologies similarly 
falling within the statutory ambit.  The copyright holder thus has little incentive to develop or 




This combination of asymmetric incentives is therefore likely to make the redesign or inventing 
around option highly attractive.  Much as in patent, copyright inventing around may be socially 
wasteful for channeling inventive effort toward new methods of reproduction or distribution 
when adequate methods are already available.  The social desirability of such inventing around 
depends upon whether Judge Chin’s assertions are both correct and typical – whether designing a 
technological alternative to public performance, using scores of dime-sized antennae is an 
inefficient design intended only to circumvent some legal language, or whether it may instead 
constitute a useful innovation.  But as a counterexample, it seems that the peer-to-peer 
architectures developed in the wake of the Napster ruling are in fact useful for some applications 
and society is better off possessing the technology – for example, at the time of this writing, 
Netflix appears to be considering such peer-to-peer systems as a better way to deliver authorized 





As late as 2010, the entertainment industry was still locked in legal battles with peer-to-peer 
service providers, successfully enjoining the operators of LimeWire, another Napster successor 
operating on Gnutella technology (Arista Records v. Lime Group, 2010). Continuing the Napster 
secondary liability strategy, copyright owners alleged vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement, but the winning allegation was for Grokster-style inducement: the federal district 
court in that held LimeWire’s failure to adopt infringement dampening technology was 
particularly strong evidence of intent to encourage infringement.   
 
At the same time, however, such arguments gained less traction in the contemporaneous lawsuit 
by motion picture copyright holders led by Viacom against the YouTube video repository  
(Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, 2012).  YouTube’s defensive combination of an automated copyright 
policing technology and takedown procedures complying with provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act provided a robust and credible response against secondary liability 
claims requiring nefarious intent, specific knowledge, or the opportunity to supervise and 
control.  Thus, one technical legacy of the Napster line of cases might be movement toward 
adoption of technological measures for monitoring digital content, simply as evidence against 
allegations of knowledge or nefarious intent (Menell and Nimmer, 2007). 
 
But far more striking is the pattern of “inventing around” legal formalisms that emerges from 
careful review Napster and its legacy.  Although copyright is ostensibly directed to promoting 
creative works by securing exclusive rights to authors, in fact it has a somewhat hidden hand in 
fostering or shaping technological progress.  By siting the exclusive rights of copyright in 
technical actions, copyright law fosters the conditions for repeated technological avoidance.  And 
if copyright is unwittingly shaping such technological progress, this effect requires closer 
consideration and more explicit recognition, either as a policy goal or as a policy by-product, 
than Congress or the courts have granted it to date. 
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